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Abstract: Roughly 1,400 Finnish volunteers served in the German Schutzstaffel 
(SS) organisation and its Wiking division between 1941 and 1943. This article 
discusses reasons for sending Finnish volunteers, the stages of recruitment and the 
military operations of the volunteers and analyses Finnish research of military 
history on Finnish SS volunteers after the Second World War. The initiative to 
recruit Finnish SS volunteers did not come from Finland. It originally came from 
the SS, not from Germany or its armed forces. According to Finland’s political and 
military leaders, a better option would have been for the volunteers to join the 
Wehrmacht, but this did not present any obstacle to giving consent. They clutched 
at straws offered by Germany. Volunteers consequently acquired an important role 
as a pawn for the Germany’s support. The debate over research in Finland in the 
2017–2019 period shows that there is still a place for further studies into the 






Finnish volunteers served in the German Schutzstaffel (SS) organisation 
and its Wiking division between 1941 and 1943. The roots of the SS 
organisation date back to 1923 when Stabswache, Adolf Hitler’s small 
personal bodyguard, was established. At first, it was a separate unit within 
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the Sturmabteilung (SA). The three pillars of the SS that were formed later 
were the general Allgemeine SS, the security service Sicherheitsdienst 
(SD) and the police forces, which were merged into the SS 
Reichsicherheitshauptampt (RSHA), the Reich Main Security Office, in 
1939, as well as the military section which first consisted of bodyguard 
troops. At the end of the 1930s, the armed wing of the SS were divided 
into combat troops, bodyguard troops and Totenkopf troops. The name 
Waffen SS was originally introduced on 2 March 1940. The Finnish SS 
battalion was part of the Waffen SS and its combat troops, SS-
Verfügungstruppe. When writing this text in February 2019, only eight of 
the approximately 1,400 Finnish volunteers are still alive.1 
During the Second World War, Finland was engaged in three separate, 
albeit highly interlinked, wars. The Winter War from 30 November, 1939, 
to 13 March, 1940, was a defensive struggle over life and death against the 
superior force of the Soviet Union which attacked Finland. Following the 
brief Interim Peace and three days after Germany attacked the Soviet 
Union on 22 June, 1941, Finland joined the war against the Soviet Union. 
In the Continuation War, Finland’s ultimate goal was to take back the 
territories it lost in the Winter War. The Continuation War ended with a 
ceasefire called on 4–5 September, 1944, after heavy defensive battles. 
Finland signed a separate peace pact with the Soviet Union, including 
conditions imposed on Finland. One of the many conditions was that 
Finland needed to drive any German troops out of the country. In the 
middle of September 1944, the Lapland War broke out between Finland 
and Germany. It ended on 27 April, 1945, after the final German troops 
withdrew from Finnish Lapland to Norway. 
In the decades following the Second World War, the war years of 
1939–1945 have been studied extensively in Finnish research into military 
history. The war years have been the most significant research topic, but 
 
1 Read more about the development stages of the SS, for example Stein, Georg. H.: 
Waffen-SS ‒ Hitlerin eliittikaarti sodassa 1939‒1945, Translated into Finnish by 
Jouni Suistola, Ajatus kirjat, Jyväskylä, 2004, pp. 20‒27, 30‒55, 61‒61 and 75‒76; 
Williamson, Gordon: Waffen-SS ‒ Saksan eliittijoukot 1933‒1945, Translated into 
Finnish by Juha Väänänen, Koala-kustannus, Hämeenlinna, 2006, pp. 9‒13 and 37; 
Jokipii, Mauno: Hitlerin Saksa ja sen vapaaehtoisliikkeet ‒ Waffen-SS:n 
suomalaispataljoona vertailtavana, Suomalaisen kirjallisuuden seura, Jyväskylä, 
2002a, pp. 107‒108; Jokipii, Mauno: Panttipataljoona ‒ suomalaisen SS-
pataljoonan historia, WSOY, Jyväskylä, 2000, Fourth Edition (1. Edition 1968), 
pp. 129‒151. 




also a fruitful theme for memoirs and literature. The role of the Finnish 
Volunteer Battalion of the Waffen SS in fights against the Soviet Union in 
1941–1943 is no exception, as many memoirs, books and studies have 
been published on the theme.  
This article discusses reasons for sending Finnish volunteers, the stages 
of recruitment and the military operations of the volunteers and analyses 
Finnish research of military history on Finnish SS volunteers after the 
Second World War. 
 
2. Recruitment – reasons and background 
 
According to certain interpretations, the first ideas of the Finnish SS 
battalion were presented in the winter of 1940 when the Winter War was 
closing, when Erkki Räikkönen wrote a letter to Reichsführer-SS Heinrich 
Himmler regarding the provision of leadership training for Finnish soldiers 
in Germany. The aim was to make Finland more favourable towards 
National Socialism. Räikkönen was the editor-in-chief of the National 
Socialist paper Gustav Vasa and the private secretary of President Pehr 
Evind Svinhufvud. This cannot actually be regarded as the starting point 
for the recruitment of Finnish SS volunteers, as Räikkönen’s intentions 
were purely political: his letter was only a proposal to start military 
training, to which the SS gave a negative response. Lieutenant General 
Leonard Grandell, who served as the Chief of Military Economy, is known 
to have been in talks with Joseph Veltjens, a German arms dealer and a 
liaison for the transit of German troops through Finland, regarding the 
establishment of a jaeger battalion in the Wehrmacht in August 1940. 
Grandell and Major General Paavo Talvela talked about this on many 
occasions in the autumn of 1940, both in Finland and in Germany, for 
example, with Veltjens and Albrecht Ochs, a Major in the Luftwaffe, but 
not about the recruitment of SS soldiers.2 
 
2 Jokipii, Mauno: Jatkosodan synty ‒ Tutkimuksia Saksan ja Suomen sotilaallisesta 
yhteistyöstä 1940‒41, Otava, Keuruu, 1987, p. 190; Westerlund, Lars: Cirkus 
Collani – De finländska SS-frivilliga 1941–43: En sedesskildring baserad på de 
frivilligas egna berättelser, Book on Demand, Helsinki, 2017, pp. 118‒120; 
Jokisipilä, Markku‒Könönen, Janne: Kolmannen valtakunnan vieraat ‒ Suomi 
Hitlerin Saksan vaikutuspiirissä 1933‒1944, Otava, Keuruu, 2013, p. 274; Jokipii 
(2000), pp. 23‒24; Airio, Pentti: Walter Horn ‒ ensimmäinen jääkäri ja kylmän 
sodan pohjola-aktivisti, Docendo, Saarijärvi, 2013, p. 115; Mikola, K. J.: Vuosien 
1940‒1941 suomalaissaksalaisen yhteistoiminnan tarkoitusperien ja muotojen 
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Regarding these events in the early autumn of 1940, it should be noted 
that Finland was facing the second crisis of the Interim Peace in August 
and September 1940. The first crisis was in June 1940 when the Soviet 
Baltic Fleet operated actively in the Baltic Sea and a Finnish passenger 
plane, the Kaleva, was shot down over the Gulf of Finland. The Soviet 
actions were not a direct threat against Finland, but the finalisation of the 
bolshevisation of the Baltic countries. On the basis of several domestic 
and foreign diplomatic sources, it is clear that Finland was afraid of a 
surprise attack on Finland by the Soviet Union in August and September 
1940. According to the intelligence gathered, the Red Army had increased 
its manpower on the Finnish border from 15 to 22 divisions.3 
The Soviet threat did not materialise in the early autumn of 1940, 
apparently due to the Germans transferring more troops to their eastern 
border and showing signs of their increasing interest towards the Nordic 
countries. Germany’s foothold in the Nordic countries increased when it 
conquered Finnmark in response to the Soviet Union’s pressure on Finland 
and signed an agreement on the transit of German troops through Finland, 
extending the trade agreement signed with Finland in the summer of 1940 
and the agreement on the transit of German troops through Sweden. 
Support for Germany increased when Adolf Hitler told the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Molotov in negotiations held in Berlin on 12–
13 November, 1940, that Germany would not accept any plans the Soviet 
Union has against Finland and that Finland would enjoy German 
protection in this respect. However, this support was not made public.4 
The initiative to recruit Finnish SS volunteers did not come from 
Finland, but from Germany. This initiative was related to the start of 
recruitment in Denmark and Norway. On 20 April, 1940, the Germans 
decided to establish Nordland, a Nordic SS division. This decision was 
made only 11 days after the operation to conquer Denmark and Norway 
started. The purpose was to establish the first SS volunteer division 
_____ 
tarkastelua. Tiede ja ase No. 25, Mikkeli, 1967, pp. 124‒129; Terä, Martti V.: 
Kohtalokas syksy 1950. Tiede ja ase No. 22, Mikkeli, 1964, pp. 276‒312; 
Manninen, Ohto: Ajatuksena uusi Jääkäripataljoona 27 – Suomalaisen SS-
pataljoonan syntyvaiheet, Parole 2/2011, Jääkäripataljoonan 27 perinne-yhdistys, 
Helsinki, 2011, p. 3. 
3 Jokipii (2000), p. 19‒20; Jokipii, Mauno: Suomalaisen SS-pataljoonan 
perustamiseen johtaneet syyt. Tieke, Wilhelm (ed.): Suomalainen SS-pataljoona, 
Wiking-divisioona Oy, Jyväskylä 2002b, pp. 7‒8. 
4 Jokipii (2000), pp. 19‒21; Jokipii (2002b), pp. 7‒8; Jokipii (1987), pp. 143‒147. 




outside Germany. The Germans needed more than 2,000 Nordic 
volunteers. However, the recruitment proceeded more slowly than 
expected in the summer of 1940. By the end of June, some 200 volunteers 
from Norway, 110 volunteers from Denmark and a few from Sweden had 
enlisted. In Western Europe, recruitment was quicker than in the Nordics, 
as more than 1,000 men were recruited for Westland, an SS regiment of 
Dutch and Flemish volunteers, in the first two months. New recruitment 
offices in Copenhagen and Oslo aimed to match this pace.5 
Brigadeführer6 Gottlob Berger, Chief of SS-Hauptamt, started 
preparations for expanding recruitment for Nordland to Finland in 
November 1940. As interpreted by Mauno Jokipii, the first ideas for 
recruiting volunteers in Finland were based on the attempt to include as 
many Nordic countries as possible at the same time, not on the slow 
progress made in Denmark and Norway, even though these types of 
interpretations have also been made. It should be noted that at this time 
Finland and Sweden were planning to form a union starting from August 
1940. However, these plans were cancelled by January 1941 due to 
opposition from both the Soviet Union and Germany.7  
Before any recruitment started, Berger wanted to be certain of the 
possibilities of success. A trip to Finland was made in secret from the 
Auswärtiges Amt, the German Federal Foreign Office, and from the 
Germany Embassy in Helsinki. It was the rule rather than the exception 
that the SS did not use official diplomatic channels. In January 1941, Ola 
Vinberg, Berger’s number one man and a Swedish businessman who lived 
in Berlin, travelled to Finland. Vinberg talked with activists in Helsinki 
and wanted to know how willing the Finns were to join the recently 
established SS Division Wiking. Its regiments were Germania, Westland 
and Nordland. The purpose was to establish the first of the regiments as 
the backbone of the division, mainly consisting of German troops. Dutch 
and Flemish volunteers would make up the Westland regiment, and 
 
5 Trigg, Jonathan: Hitlerin viikingit ‒ Waffen-SS:n pohjoismaalaiset vapaa-
ehtoiset, Koala-kustannus, EU, 2013, pp. 47‒48; Jokipii (2000), pp. 21‒27 
and 915‒921.  
6  Brigadeführer matched the rank of a Major General in the Wehrmacht. 
7 Jokipii (2000), pp. 22‒35 and 143; Jokipii (2002b), p. 8; Jokipii (1987), pp. 
125‒130 and 190. 
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volunteers recruited from Denmark and Norway would mainly form the 
Nordland regiment.8   
According to information reported by Vinberg, which was most likely 
exaggerated, some 700 Finns were willing to join the SS. Pentti Airio’s 
interpretation of the Finnish Government giving its consent to recruiting 
Finnish volunteers as early as in January in 1941 does not seem credible, 
as Vinberg’s unofficial trip was dangerous in terms of Finland’s foreign 
policy: in January and February, the relationship between Finland and the 
Soviet Union was tense due to the crisis involving the Petsamo nickel 
mine. As Jokipii interpreted it, Finland’s political leaders would most 
likely have put a stop to Vinberg’s secret inquiries if they had known 
about them, as the threat of a war between Finland and the Soviet Union 
was once again very real. From the German point of view, the inquiries 
paid off, as Himmler gave his consent to recruitment on 30 January, 1941. 
The next day, Colonel Horst Rössing, a German military attaché in 
Helsinki, inquired about Germany’s attitudes from Oberkommando der 
Wehrmacht (OKW), the High Command of the Wehrmacht, towards the 
recruitment of Finnish volunteers for the Nordland regiment. On 20 
February, 1941, Hitler gave his permission to recruit Finnish volunteers.9 
Brigadeführer Berger presented an official request for the recruitment 
of a Finnish volunteer SS battalion to Toivo Mikael Kivimäki, Finland’s 
ambassador in Berlin, on 1 March, 1941. Following the diplomatic code, 
Kivimäki sent information about the request to Finland and Germany’s 
ministries for foreign affairs. On 9 March, 1941, the Auswärtiges Amt 
assigned Wipert von Blücher, Germany’s ambassador in Helsinki, to 
obtain the consent of the Finnish Government to the recruitment of a 
Finnish volunteer SS battalion. The first round of negotiations between 
Blücher and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland was held on 11 
March, 1941. Finland’s political and military leaders unanimously 
accepted the German proposal by 12 March, 1941. This was accepted by 
President Risto Ryti, Prime Minister Jukka Rangell, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs Rolf Witting, Minister of Defence Rudolf Walden, and Minister of 
 
8 Jokipii (2000), pp. 25‒34; Jokipii (2002b), p. 8; Jokipii (1987), p. 190; Trigg 
(2013), p. 60. 
9 Manninen (2011), p. 4; Jokipii (2000), pp. 22‒29; Jokipii (2002b), pp. 9; Jokipii 
(1987), p. 190. Cf. Airio (2013), pp. 119–121. Airio’s interpretation most likely 
confuses the date on which Jukka Rangell’s government stepped into office and 
the date on which Germany made inquiries into the possibility of recruitment. 




the Interior Ernst von Born, as well as Commander-in-Chief of the Finnish 
Defence Forces Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim. It should be noted that 
Ryti and Mannerheim, who were well-known anglophiles, were in favour 
of the project. Despite the consent, Finland’s political and military leaders 
had doubts about Finnish soldiers joining groups of soldiers from 
conquered lands. According to them, a better option would have been for 
the volunteers to join the Wehrmacht, but this did not present any obstacle 
to giving consent, as long as the Finnish volunteers would make up a 
separate unit. Finland’s political and military leaders clutched at straws 
offered by Germany.10 
The Soviet Union withdrew its ultimatum regarding Petsamo as late as 
on 15 March, 1941, although it was apparent ten days earlier than the 
Nickel crisis would come to a positive conclusion. Withdrawing the 
ultimatum only in the middle of March was a crucial factor in accepting 
the recruitment of Finnish SS volunteers. After all, until the withdrawal, 
the Soviet threat caused restlessness in the Finnish Government.11 
 
3. Recruitment of Finnish SS volunteers 
 
The promise made by Finland’s political leaders to recruit Finnish SS 
volunteers was not made public, and this consent did not mean that 
Finland would make a political turn towards National Socialism. It should 
be noted that the recruitment of SS volunteers was not covered in the war-
responsibility trials after the wars. Practical arrangements for recruitment 
were not made through official channels, and a private committee was set 
up for this purpose. Recruitment was not even discussed at official 
diplomatic meetings, given the explosiveness of the issue. Similarly, the 
Finnish Defence Forces were officially kept out, and the few active 
officers who signed up as volunteers were forced to resign from their 
duties. Recruitment processes were carried out in complete silence. 
Standartenführer12 Paul Dahm represented the SS in Finland in terms of 
recruitment. At first, Jaeger Lieutenant Colonel Ragnar Nordström, a 
shipowner from Loviisa, was planned to head the committee but, after he 
refused, Hallitusneuvos (a Finnish honorary title) Esko Riekki was 
 
10 Manninen (2011), p. 4; Jokipii (2002b), pp. 9‒10 and 12‒13; Jokipii (2000), pp. 
35‒36. 
11 Jokipii (2002b), p. 9; Jokipii (1987), p. 190; Jokipii (2000), p. 28. 
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selected. He had formerly worked as the chief of the state police. He also 
had experience in the Jaeger Battalion 27.13 
Riekki’s committee started on 25 March, 1941, by setting conditions 
related to recruitment. The committee wanted to prevent the use of Finnish 
volunteers in actions against countries other than the Soviet Union. In 
addition, Finnish volunteers were not to swear a military oath to Hitler like 
other SS troops. The committee also found it important that the 
recruitment would cover all parts of the nation, including the social 
democrats. At first, the committee also required that Finnish volunteers 
should not join any regiment together with SS volunteers from conquered 
countries. In other words, Finnish volunteers should not serve in the 
Nordland regiment of the Wiking division. According to the fourth 
condition, Finnish volunteers would be exempt from their commitments if 
Finland were to be war with the Soviet Union without any German 
involvement.14 
These conditions postponed the start of recruitment by three weeks, and 
the recruitment process started only in the middle of April 1941. The start 
of recruitment was possible after the conditions set by Riekki’s committee 
were changed to proposals on 16 April, 1941. In its response given on 28 
April, 1941, Germany accepted some of the proposals. During training, 
Finnish volunteers would be kept separate from volunteers from 
conquered countries. Recruitment would cover large parts of the nation so 
that volunteers would not only be recruited from the right wing, but from 
all groups. Germany also accepted that Finnish volunteers would be able 
to return to Finland if Finland was at war with the Soviet Union on its 
own.15 
Even though the start of recruitment extended over the middle of April 
1941, a recruitment office was established in Helsinki on 7 April, 1941. Its 
code name was Engineering Agency Ratas. After the recruitment process 
started, the recruitment office ensured that the volunteers represented all 
parts of the nation as required by Riekki’s committee. The state police 
checked the backgrounds of the volunteers, and a separately appointed 
_____ 
12 Standartenführer equalled the rank of a Colonel in the Wehrmacht. 
13 Jokipii (2000), pp. 35‒45; Jokipii (2002b), pp. 10 and 13; Jokipii (1987), pp. 
192‒195. 
14 Jokipii (2000), pp. 35‒45; Jokipii (2002b), p. 10. 
15 Jokipii (2000), pp. 42‒48, 50‒53 and 88–96; Jokipii (2002b), p. 10; Ratas, 
Unnumbered document ”kiertokirje värvääjille”, 17.4.1941. Kansallisarkisto, The 
 




police officer worked in the recruitment office. The primary aim of the 
background checks was to prevent communists from infiltrating the group 
of volunteers. Another goal was to exclude any volunteers from the far-
right. The rejection of many volunteers from the far-right caused agitation 
in Finland’s far-right circles. However, selections were made on the basis 
of pre-defined criteria under Riekki’s leadership. As a result, it can be 
stated that the purpose was not to send volunteers to Germany for political 
training, but to form an elite military group and to send Finnish volunteers 
to join German troops on the front. However, it should be noted that the 
recruiters under Riekki’s committee sent roughly one third of all 
volunteers, while the remaining two thirds were sent by circles of 
volunteers. Far-right groups played an important part in the recruitment 
process, as expected.16 
Some 2,000 volunteers signed up, of which 1,197 were selected for the 
Finnish SS battalion and sent to Germany. Of these, 76 were officers, one 
of whom was sent as a non-commissioned officer (NCO), and four of 
whom were active officers. Mauno Jokipii has estimated that some 20 per 
cent of the recruited volunteers were from the far-right on the basis of the 
member archive of the SS Brothers-in-Arms Association. André 
Swanström has estimated that the far-right represented some 47 per cent of 
all volunteers on the basis of the party information provided by the 
volunteers in their service agreements. The far-right included 60 per cent 
of the volunteers who provided information about their political views. 
The right wing was over-represented, which should be considered to be 
expected rather than surprising. Some 36 per cent of all volunteers did not 
express their political views.17 
_____ 
National Archives of Finland (KA) Pk 1141/49. 
16 Manninen (2011), pp. 7–9; Jokipii (2000), pp. 45‒47 and 77; Swanström, André: 
Hakaristin ritarit – Suomalaiset SS-miehet, politiikka, uskonto ja sotarikokset, 
Atena, EU, 2018, pp. 45–57; Jokipii (2002b), pp. 10‒11; Jokipii (1999), p. 15. See 
also Kyösti, Jukka‒From, Synnöve: Suomalaisena SS-miehenä itärintamalla ‒ 
Herkko Koskinen aseveljineen itärintamalla, Minerva, Porvoo, 2016, pp. 12‒13; 
Unnumbered and undated conditions of service for Finnish SS-volunteers. KA 
Valpo II IX A4 3190 46; Unnumbered and undated commitment to service for 
Finnish SS-volunteers. KA Valpo II IX A4 3189 45; Ratas, Unnumbered document 
”kiertokirje värvääjille”, 17.4.1941. KA Pk 1141/49; Ratas, Unnumbered 
document ”kiertokirje värvääjille”, 24.4.1941. KA Valpo II IX A4 3189 45. 
17 Jokipii (2000), pp. 96‒103; Elo, Veikko: Pantin lunastajat, Apali, Hämeenlinna, 
2006, pp. 14‒16 and 219; Swanström (2018), pp. 45–57; Jokipii, Mauno: Suomen 
SS-pataljoona toisessa maailmansodassa. Leskinen, Jari‒Juutilainen, Antti (eds.): 
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Ever since the end of March 1941, Germany had wanted to expand the 
Finnish SS battalion into an SS regiment. Partly for this reason, it was 
decided to recruit more officers and NCOs than required for a battalion. 
Berger wanted to increase the number of Finnish volunteers to 2,000 or 
even to 2,400 men. The Finnish Government rejected the German proposal 
to establish an SS regiment in late May 1941, and the recruitment process 
ended at the beginning of June 1941. Germany and Finland had highly 
differing goals from the start: Germany wanted to recruit the ranks, while 
Finland wanted to have access to high-quality military training and service 
in modern military organisations.18 These conflicting views caused a 
structural flaw in the composition of the SS battalion. 
As already stated, many Finnish circles were in favour of allowing 
Finnish troops to join the Wehrmacht instead of the SS as proposed by 
Lieutenant General Grandell in the late summer and autumn of 1940. Ohto 
Manninen sees that the aim of a few Finnish volunteers joining the 
Wehrmacht was to stop the recruitment process before it even started. It is 
understandable that the SS was not ready to assent, considering the 
limitations set for replacements – only two per cent from each German age 
group eligible for military service – and the reasons for starting the 
recruitment. The will of Finland’s military leaders for Finnish volunteers 
to join the Wehrmacht was the most apparent in military negotiations 
between Germany and Finland in early summer 1941. During the 
negotiations, Finland wanted to repatriate Finnish SS volunteers, or at 
least volunteer officers, to Finland, because Finland’s military and 
political position had changed considerably during the spring of 1941.19 
_____ 
Jatkosodan pikkujättiläinen, WSOY, 2005, p. 58; Westerlund, Lars: The Finnish 
SS-volunteers and atrocities against Jews, Civilians and Prisoners of War in 
Ukraine and the Caucasus Region 1941–1943, Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden seura 
ja Kansallisarkisto, Helsinki, 2019, pp. 17, 26‒28 ja 43; Ratas, Unnumbered and 
undated lists of rejected and skipped volunteers. KA Pk 1141/55. As listed by 
Ratas, 295 registered volunteers did not show up for examinations, and 397 
volunteers were rejected. Lars Westerlund holds the view that Finland’s military 
leaders kept a close eye on the recruitment and gave their permission for the 
different recruitment stages. 
18 Jokipii, Mauno: Suomalaisen SS-pataljoonan vaiheet 1941‒1943. Suomalaisten 
Waffen-SS vapaaehtoisten matrikkeli 1941‒1943, Wiking, Jyväskylä, 1999, p. 14; 
Jokipii (2000), pp. 60–64; Swanström (2018), p. 305. 
19 Manninen (2011), pp. 6‒9; Manninen, Ohto: Suomalaisen SS-pataljoonan 
syntyvaiheet, Sotilasaikakauslehti 10/1981, Upseeriliitto, Helsinki, 1981, pp. 
697‒698; Jokipii (1987), pp. 190‒207; Jokipii (2002b), pp. 10‒12; Jokipii (2000), 
 




Germany did not consent and kept the Finnish volunteers as part of the 
SS troops. In reality, no changes were possible at the beginning of June 
1941, as preparations were already well underway. Another major obstacle 
was that the initiative originally came from the SS, not from Germany or 
its armed forces. Furthermore, the proposals presented by Riekki’s 
committee in June 1941 for the Finnish troops to be called a jaeger 
battalion were unproductive. Even though Finnish military circles wanted 
to work more closely with the Wehrmacht, it must be stated that, at the 
same time, Finland’s far-right radicals continued to maintain contact with 
the SS in the autumn of 1940 and spring of 1941.20 Germany, as the first 
party to act and as the provider of protection, was able to dictate terms and 
deviate from pre-defined conditions, as is shown by the events of the 
summer and autumn of 1941. 
 
4. Transportation of Finnish SS volunteers to Germany 
 
Even though the Finnish Government did not officially take any part in the 
recruitment or transportation of the volunteers, its role was seen, for 
example, in that the volunteers were allowed to travel from Finland to 
German-occupied territories without a passport.21 The volunteers started 
their journey, in the spirit of jaeger traditions, from Ostrobotnia, a building 
owned by three Ostrobothnian student nations of Helsinki University. The 
volunteers were transported to German-occupied territories in five batches 
between 6 May and 5 June, 1941, on vessels under the agreement on the 
transit of German troops through Finland. Four of these vessels sailed 
from Turku to Danzig and one from Vaasa to Stettin. A total of 1,197 
Finnish volunteers were sent in this first wave, one third of whom were 
considered experienced and the remaining two thirds inexperienced. The 
first 429 volunteers were later called division men and the next volunteers 
battalion boys. In total, 768 battalion boys were transported. All 
experienced division men were shipped in the first three groups. After 
arriving in Germany, all groups were first sent to SS garrisons in Stralsund 
for a few days.22 
_____ 
pp. 57‒59 and 139–147; Westerlund (2019), pp. 16‒17. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Jokipii (1999), pp. 14‒15. 
22 Suomalaiset SS-vapaaehtoiset ja väkivaltaisuudet juutalaisia, siviilejä ja sota-
vankeja kohtaan Ukrainassa ja Kaukasuksella 1941–1943, p. 5, Summary in 
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When sent to German-occupied territories, the Finnish volunteers were 
divided into two groups. More experienced volunteers were first sent 
rapidly via the Heuberg military training centre to Silesia where the 
Wiking division had its staging area. Even though the volunteers were 
generally divided on the basis of their past military experience and their 
military training, not all the division men had military experience. 
Roughly two thirds of them had served on the front during the Winter 
War, while nearly eight per cent had no experience. Approximately half of 
the experienced Finnish volunteers were placed in the Nordland regiment, 
whereas the division men who were sent first were mainly placed in the 
Westland regiment. The Nordland regiment had 230 and the Westland 
regiment had 81 Finnish volunteers.23 
Officers were placed in the division on the basis of their military 
branches. A small group of Finnish volunteers also served in independent 
detachments of the division. Young volunteers from the first three batches 
were transported from the Heuberg military training centre to the Vienna-
Schönbrunn training centre. Volunteers from the fourth and fifth batches 
were all sent via Stralsund to the Vienna region for training. Riekki only 
obtained information about the division of the Finnish volunteers into two 
groups on 9 June, 1941, when he arrived in Berlin. On that date, the 
division men were already in the Wiking division’s staging area in Silesia, 
due to which it was no longer possible to change the SS decision. 
Germany made this decision as it wanted to have the whole of Europe join 
its crusade against bolshevism. In this way, Germany ensured that it would 
later be able to report that Finland was involved in the fights with 
Germany and its SS troops against the Soviet Union from the very 
beginning.24 
_____ 
Finnish, Westerlund, Lars: The Finnish SS-volunteers and atrocities against Jews, 
Civilians and Prisoners of War in Ukraine and the Caucasus Region 1941–1943, 
8.2.2019. [https://arkisto.fi/uploads/Arkisto/2.pdf]. Accessed 9 February 2019; 
Jokipii (2000), pp. 109–122, 168, 427 and 674; Jokipii (1999), pp. 14‒16; Y. P. I. 
Kaila´s letter to Ratas, 26.5.1941. KA Pk 1141/53. The numbers of people 
presented by Mauno Jokipii differ slightly. According to Jokipii, 1,208 volunteers 
were transported to Germany on five different occasions. However, after these are 
divided into 421 division men and 786 battalion boys, the total number is only 
1,207. In addition to minor differences in the figures presented by Jokipii, they 
differ slightly from Veikko Elo’s figures used in this article. 
23 Jokipii (2000), pp. 104‒105, 109–126 and 166–174; Jokipii (2002b), p. 12; Elo 
(2006), pp. 22‒25. 
24 Jokipii (2002b), p. 12; Elo (2006), pp. 22‒25; Jokipii (2000), pp. 104‒105, 109–
 




In addition to the Finnish division men, the SS Division Wiking 
consisted of 631 Dutch, 294 Norwegian and 216 Danish volunteers plus 
one Swedish volunteer in June 1941. This demonstrates that most of the 
Wiking division’s soldiers were German. After all the division consisted of 
more than 19,300 soldiers when Operation Barbarossa started. As with 
the Finnish volunteers, the total number of recruited SS volunteers was 
higher in the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark and Sweden than the number 
of volunteers registered in the division. The total number of foreign 
volunteers and their proportion of the total strength of the Wiking division 
increased slightly during the first year of the war, and Flemish volunteers 
also joined its ranks, but the total number of volunteers, and soldiers 
altogether in the division, soon started to decrease due to heavy losses.25 
The recruitment of Finnish SS volunteers only became public after 5 
June, 1941, when it was in the news of the Times and the BBC. Finland 
only released information about the existence of a volunteer SS battalion 
to the press on 11 August, 1941, but this information was placed under 
censorship four days later. In Finland, the volunteer SS battalion was 
under the administration of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, as the 
Ministry of Defence or the Finnish Defence Forces were not to be 
involved in its management. After all, the aim was to prevent the Finnish 
Defence Forces from making any compromises over the foreign policy 
from the recruitment stage by forcing active officers to resign from active 
duty. In terms of administration, the position of the Finnish SS volunteers 
differed from that of other SS volunteers in that they were not under the 
direct leadership of SS headquarters, as the battalion served under 
Finland’s ambassador in Berlin, the military attaché stationed in Berlin 
and the military attaché’s assistant appointed for this purpose. Finland was 




126 and 166–174; Jokisipilä, Markku: Aseveljiä vai liittolaisia? Suomi, Hitlerin 
Saksan liittosopimusvaatimus ja Rytin-Ribbentropin sopimus, Suomalaisen 
kirjallisuuden seura, Helsinki, 2004, pp. 27‒60.  
25 Westerlund (2019), pp. 22‒24; Jokipii (1987), p. 188; Jokipii (2000), pp. 
155‒170 and 433; Manninen (1981), p. 697. 
26 Jokipii (2002b), p. 10; Jokipii (2005), pp. 58‒60; Jokipii (2000), pp. 56 and 65; 
Lackman, Matti: SS-miehet ja jääkärit – yhtymäkohtia ja vertailua. Sota-
historiallinen aikakauskirja 31, Sotamuseo ja Suomen Sotahistoriallinen Seura, 
Tallinna, 2001, pp. 176–177. 




5. Finnish Volunteer Battalion – military operations, losses and 
replacements 
 
In the summer and autumn of 1941, the division men participated in 
operations of Heeresgruppe Süd, Germany’s Army Group South, with the 
Wiking division. The division faced its hardest battles of the summer when 
attempting to break the Stalin Line in Tarnopol on the Soviet border at the 
beginning of July as it participated in different phases of the encirclement 
battles around Kiev and when trying to clear the banks and bends of the 
river Dnieper. In the autumn, the Wiking division fought its most intense 
battles crossing the Dnieper and at the bridgehead fight at the beginning of 
September, in fast-paced operations north of the Sea of Azov in October 
and in the supporting attack which aimed to take over Rostov-on-Don 
north of the city at the beginning of November. The rapid recruitment of 
the Finnish SS volunteers and their transportation to German-occupied 
territories presented challenges, particularly during the first phase of 
Operation Barbarossa, as the insufficient linguistic skills of the division 
men, combined with their lack of training regarding German weapons and 
their unfamiliarity with German leadership principles, caused problems. In 
addition, Finnish officers and NCOs were mainly not assigned to positions 
matching their military rank, which caused additional problems.27 
Since experienced officers and NCOs fought as part of Operation 
Barbarossa, German trainers had to be used in the training centre located 
close to Vienna – or rather were used at Germany’s request – even though 
the original idea was that Finnish soldiers would train other Finnish 
soldiers. It was marked that the training battalion – SS-Freiwilligen 
Bataillon Nord Ost – was established on 15 June, 1941, and its name was 
changed to Finnisches Freiwilligen-Bataillon der Waffen-SS, the Finnish 
Volunteer Battalion of the Waffen SS, on 13 September, 1941. Following 
Vienna, other training locations included Stralsund and Gross-Born, where 
the battalion swore its military oath and pledged its allegiance to Adolf 
Hitler on 15 October, 1941. According to the original training plan, the 
Finnish battalion was to be trained until 26 October, 1941, but in August, 
SS leaders demanded that the training period be halved and that the 
 
27 Tieke, Wilhelm: Suomalainen SS-pataljoona, Wiking-divisioona Oy, Jyväskylä, 
2002, pp. 18‒20; Jokipii (2002b), p. 12; Jokipii (2005), p. 61; Jokipii (2000), pp. 
185–301; Westerlund (2019), p. 25. 




battalion be ready for combat by 22 September, 1941. Finland’s insisted 
on maintaining a sufficient training period due to its life-saving nature and 
the training was continued until 10 October, 1941. This explains why the 
Finnish Volunteer Battalion of the Waffen SS took part in the flag 
presentation and took its military oath in the middle of October. After this, 
the battalion was meant to transfer to the German eastern front as part of 
the Nordland regiment but, due to defects found in its officers’ tactical 
competence, the training period was extended by two weeks.28 
At the beginning of November, an SS replacement battalion was set up 
in Graz, Austria, from which Finnish volunteers in hospitals, on leave and 
on duty would be sent to the SS Division Wiking through a Finnish 
replacement company. The Finnish replacement company was originally 
set up on 21 September, 1941, in Gross-Born, from where it was sent to 
Graz via Radom in Poland. After offensive operations and a brief retreat at 
the end of November, the Wiking division dug into position for the winter 
in November and December 1941 by the Mius River, located in the 
southern part of the German eastern front. The defensive and retreat 
battles north of Rostov-on-Don at the end of November were so fierce in 
the Wiking division’s section that Soviet and British propaganda claimed 
that the entire division had been destroyed. Colonel Walter Horn, 
Finland’s military attaché in Berlin, tried to calm Finnish minds at the end 
of the year by refuting these claims of complete destruction, even though 
any exact numbers of losses were still unknown in Berlin. However, the 
total losses were so high that the motorised division, which was originally 
much stronger than a typical German division, had become an infantry 
division, and was no longer fit for combat as a motorised unit.29 
 
28 Jokipii (2000), pp. 311–377; Tieke (2002), pp. 18‒20; Jokipii (2002b), p. 12; 
Jokipii (2005), p. 61; Airio (2013), pp.119–121; Finland’s Military Attaché in 
Berlin, Document No. 830/13c/sal./29.10.1941. KA T 5635/2. 
29 Finland’s Military Attaché in Berlin, Document No. 1094/13c/sal./29.12.1941. 
KA T 5635/2; Jokipii (2000), pp. 155–161, 295–328, 377–379 and 387–389; 
Westerlund (2019), p. 25. The progress of the German Army Group South slowed 
starting from mid-October 1941 due to mud and problems with supplies and fuel. 
These decelerated the attack and interrupted its continuous development. The 
slower attack by the Germans and temporary stops enabled the Red Army to seal 
up its defences and organise countermeasures. The German Army Group South 
and its southernmost III Army Corps took over Rostov-on-Don on 20 November, 
1941. This remained the culmination of the attack carried out in the summer and 
autumn of 1941, as on 1 December, 1941, Germany had to retreat from Rostov-on-
Don, to which it was planned that the Finnish battalion would be hurriedly 
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Of the Finnish division men, 63 had died, 11 were missing and 180 
were wounded at the end of 1941. By early 1942 when the Finnish 
battalion was united, the number of the deceased increased to 78 division 
men, as there were more losses before and after the start of the year and as 
most of those missing were actually dead. By the end of January, there 
were 81 fallen division men. The total losses of more than 60 per cent of 
the division men were more than double the total losses of the Wiking 
division and German troops, and nearly four times higher than losses on 
the Finnish front in 1941.30 Overall, the losses were enormous. 
After an additional training period, the Finnish battalion was due to 
transfer from Gross-Born to Ukraine in early November 1941. However, 
its transfer was postponed by a month as a result of high winter 
transportation volumes on the German eastern front. The reason Colonel 
Horn reported to Finland seems to be the most credible and natural, even 
though Jokipii interpreted that the transfer was postponed due to other 
reasons. Transportation after the training period in Gross-Born started on 
3–4 December, 1941. After its concentration, the battalion was assigned to 
the Wiking division on 8 January, 1942. The battalion’s first commander 
was Hans Collani who already commanded the Finnish group during 
training and was promoted to the rank of Sturmbannführer31 after the 
concentration on 9 January, 1942. The Finnish battalion became part of the 
Nordland regiment, although it was temporarily assigned to the Westland 
regiment when it assumed its combat duties on 22 January, 1942. The 
Finnish volunteers who were previously part of the SS Division Wiking – 
the remaining division men – were slowly assigned to the Finnish SS 
battalion starting from January 1942. The Finnish battalion re-joined the 
Nordland regiment on 14 February, 1942, when the defence on the Mius 
River was reorganised.32 
_____ 
transported by air in late November. 
30 Jokipii (2000), pp. 427–430; Elo (2006), pp. 30 and 40‒41. 
31 Sturmbannführer matched the rank of a Major in the Wehrmacht.  
32 Finland’s Military Attaché in Berlin, Document No. 1094/13c/sal./29.12.1941. 
KA T 5635/2; Finnisches Freiwilligen-Bataillon der Waffen-SS, War diary 
1.11.1941–3.12.1942. KA Pk 1141/44; Finnisches Freiwilligen-Bataillon der 
Waffen-SS, Document No. Ib/10.41/Re./Di./27.10.1941; Finnisches Freiwilligen-
Bataillon der Waffen-SS, War diary´s appendices 1941–1942. KA Pk 1141/45; 
Finnisches Freiwilligen-Bataillon der Waffen-SS, Document No. Ia/1.42/ 
Hi./Hu./11.1.1942. Finnisches Freiwilligen-Bataillon der Waffen-SS, War diary´s 
appendices 1941–1942. KA Pk 1141/45; Jokipii (2002b), p. 12; Jokipii (1999), p. 
14; Jokipii (2000), pp. 327‒328, 383–389, 404, 433‒445, 463‒464, 507, 548‒563, 
 




The Finnish SS battalion did not fully participate in the German 
offensive in the summer of 1942 as part of the Wiking division, as it was 
withdrawn for training between 14 July and 9 August, 1942. Reasons for 
this training period included the introduction of new heavy weapons, a 
recap on warfare manoeuvres following trench warfare, and delays in 
vehicle replacements; after all, the Finnish battalion had lost a significant 
number of its vehicles during the concentration in the previous winter. For 
Case Blue, the Army Group South was divided into Army Groups A and 
B, with the former operating in the southernmost part of the front and 
focusing on conquering the Caucasus oil fields. Army Group B operated in 
the Volga region. The Wiking division participated in the operation as part 
of Army Group A which started its attack on 9 July, 1942, and it 
participated in the attack starting from 21 July, 1942. In July and August 
1942, the attack stretched from the Mius River to the Western Caucasus, 
and further to the Eastern Caucasus in September and October 1942. The 
Finnish battalion returned to the front lines in Maykop on 13 August, 
1942. The Finnish SS battalion suffered its heaviest losses in September 
and October 1942 when Germany made its attack in Malgobek in an 
attempt to take over the oil fields in Grozny. The Germans were unable to 
capture the oil fields.33  
Since June and July 1942, the plan was to replace the casualties of the 
Finnish SS battalion. As requested by Germany, a second round of 
recruitment was held in Finland. The number of recruited volunteers was 
_____ 
573 and 607. On 21 January, 1942, the Finnish battalion formed the fourth 
battalion of the Nordland regiment: IV/Nordland. On 2 February, 1942, the name 
was changed to IV (finn.)/Nordland. In terms of numbers, the Finnish battalion was 
at first a separate or extra battalion of the regiment. In reality, one of the Nordland 
regiment’s battalions had been broken up during the previous autumn due to 
losses, and the Finnish battalion inherited its name on 23 May, 1942, becoming III 
(finn.)/SS-Regiment Nordland. Later, the Finnish battalion also served briefly 
under the Westland and Germania regiments or as part of temporary combat 
groups and units. 
33 Finnisches Freiwilligen-Bataillon der Waffen-SS, War diary 1.11.1941–
3.12.1942. KA Pk 1141/44; Finnisches Freiwilligen-Bataillon der Waffen-SS, 
Unnumbered document “Befehl für die ausbilung in der zeit vom 16.7–8.8.1942”, 
13.7.1942. Finnisches Freiwilligen-Bataillon der Waffen-SS, War diary´s 
appendices 1941–1942. KA Pk 1141/45; Finnisches Freiwilligen-Bataillon der 
Waffen-SS, Unnumbered document “Btl.-Befehl für den vormarsch sur division”, 
9.8.1942. Finnisches Freiwilligen-Bataillon der Waffen-SS, War diary´s 
appendices 1941–1942. KA Pk 1141/45; Jokipii (2000), pp. 404‒405, 466–472 
and 501–505; Jokipii (1999), p. 14; Jokipii (2005), p. 63. 
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limited to 200 men, even though Germany requested 300 volunteers. 
Finland’s political and military leaders agreed to the additional recruitment 
process, as it was still possible in the summer of 1942 that Germany would 
win the war. Under the Finnish Army Headquarters, a replacement 
company of 200 volunteers to be sent to the SS battalion was selected 
from the Finnish Army. The Finnish Army Headquarters recruited soldiers 
from units of the Finnish Army between 3 and 27 July, 1942. The purpose 
was only to recruit regular soldiers, even though the original, quickly 
revised, announcement also included NCOs. Replacements were arranged 
not only to substitute casualties, but also to replace additional NCOs in the 
battalion. They could not be removed from their duties in the ranks before 
the arrival of replacements.34  
Around the same time on 3 August, 1942, Rolf Nevanlinna, Rector of 
Helsinki University, was appointed to head the SS volunteer committee, as 
Riekki did not enjoy Germany’s trust. In total, 239 volunteers signed up, 
of whom the 228 men who showed up were examined by a German 
committee in Kouvola on 17–20 August, 1942. Of these, 188 were 
accepted, but five refused to go. During subsequent examinations carried 
out on 29–31 August, 1942, based on personal applications, the remaining 
18 volunteers and one substitute were selected. In total, 41 volunteers were 
rejected during the first examination and five during the second 
examination. The replacement company signed its service agreements 
until 30 June, 1943, when the agreements of other Finnish volunteers 
would end. The size of the replacement company and the duration of its 
service agreements were based on the requests by military leaders who did 
not want to increase the battalion’s strength or the duration of service 
agreements.35  
 
34 Verbindungstelle des Finnisches Freiwilligen-Bataillon der Waffen-SS, 
Document No. 18/155/4.7.1942. KA Valpo II IX A4 3189 45; Päämaja, Document 
No. 2054/Ulk.1.sal./3.8.1942. KA 2530/72; Jokipii (2000), pp. 482–493 and 576; 
Elo (2006), pp. 30‒32 and 243; Jokipii (1999), p. 14; Jokipii (2005), p. 63. 
Replacements were recruited as evenly as possible from all parts of the field army 
and each battalion was able to provide at most two volunteers. 
35 Jokipii (2000), pp. 482–493 and 576; Elo (2006), pp. 30‒32 and 243; Jokipii 
(1999), p. 14; Jokipii (2005), p. 63; Swanström (2018), pp. 192–196; SS-
vapaaehtoistoimikunta, Document ”kiertokirje No. 1”, 31.10.1942. KA Valpo II IX 
A4 3189 45; Verbindungstelle des Finnisches Freiwilligen-Bataillon der Waffen-
SS, Document No. 18/155/4.7.1942. KA Valpo II IX A4 3189 45. In his study, 
Swanström proposes that the SS volunteer committee had already met on 17 June, 
1942. Jokipii interprets that the first examinations took place between 16 and 19 
 




The replacement company started from Kouvola to Pietarsaari on 4 
September, 1942, and sailed from Finland to Danzig on 8 September, 
1942. It was equipped and rapidly trained in Graz from 16 September to 7 
October, 1942. From there, the replacement company was transported to 
the Caucasus front where it arrived on 23 November, 1942. The strength 
of the replacement company was 201 soldiers, which means that 1,409 
volunteers served as SS troops between 1941 and 1943 when individual 
Finnish volunteers sent to Germany and assigned to special duties, as well 
as replacements who served in Germany and on the front are included. The 
size of the Finnish Volunteer Battalion of the Waffen SS was less than 500 
soldiers smaller than the group of Finnish jaegers who fought in the First 
World War.36 
On 20 December, 1942, it was decided that the Wiking division should 
be detached from the Caucasus front by pulling the frontline back, as more 
troops were needed in Stalingrad. However, the Finnish battalion remained 
on the front until the beginning of 1943. In January 1943, the Finnish SS 
battalion was transferred from the Caucasus to Stalingrad as part of Army 
Group Don’s operations to liberate the 6th Army which remained 
surrounded in Stalingrad. At best, the Finnish battalion was only 275 
kilometres from Stalingrad, on the south-western side of the city. The 
operation was unsuccessful, but the attack and the subsequent defensive 
battles enabled the controlled retreat of the troops located in the Caucasus. 
The Finnish SS battalion was able to retreat west of the Don River on 5–7 
February, 1943. The Finnish SS battalion participated in battles on the 
Ukrainian front until 10 April, 1943, when it was withdrawn from the 
front. Inquiries about the withdrawal of the Finnish SS battalion and its 
_____ 
August, 1942, when 186 volunteers were accepted. 
36 Jokipii (2000), pp. 109‒122; 493–498, 575‒584 and 674‒675; Elo (2006), pp. 
32‒33, 40‒41 and 62; Westerlund (2019), p. 12; Suomalaiset SS-vapaaehtoiset ja 
väkivaltaisuudet juutalaisia, siviilejä ja sotavankeja kohtaan Ukrainassa ja 
Kaukasuksella 1941–1943, p. 5, Summary in Finnish, Lars Westerlund, The 
Finnish SS-volunteers and atrocities against Jews, Civilians and Prisoners of War 
in Ukraine and the Caucasus Region 1941–1943, 8.2.2019. [https://arkisto.fi/ 
uploads/Arkisto/2.pdf]. Accessed 9 February 2019; Jokipii (1999), p. 14; Jokipii 
(2005), p. 63; Päämaja, Document No. 2054/Ulk.1.sal./3.8.1942. KA 2530/72. The 
replacement company underwent a brief supplementary training period after 
arriving at the front. It was officially attached to its battalion on 8 December, 1942. 
On the basis of Jokipii’s study, the total number of volunteers can differ greatly. 
The archival survey prepared by Lars Westerlund for the National Archives of 
Finland ended up with 1,408 Finnish volunteers. 
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return to Finland were made in Berlin in February and March 1943, as 
Germany respected the original two-year service period. However, 
Germany wanted to replace the battalion with a new battalion or even by a 
regiment.37 
Of the Finnish volunteers, 256 fell or died of illness, and 14 were 
missing. In addition, 686 were wounded, raising the total casualties to 956 
soldiers. The total losses of nearly 68 per cent were unusually high, 
considering that the total losses suffered by the Finnish Army over the 
same period were approximately 22 per cent.  However, if the total losses 
of the Finnish SS battalion are compared to German losses on the eastern 
front, the figures were small. Germany suffered total losses of nearly 85 
per cent.38 
 
6. Volunteers who returned to Finland during their service 
 
Some Finnish volunteers returned to Finland before their two-year service 
was completed. The first volunteers returned to Vaasa on 30 July, 1941, 
including 16 unused officers and three NCOs who were detached from the 
training group and sent back due to inappropriate behaviour. In September 
1941, Finland’s military leaders repeated their attempt, made first in June, 
to get the Finnish volunteers back and join Finland’s armed forces. 
Riekki’s committee had already presented similar requests in August 1941 
because insufficient linguistic skills and the inability to adapt to the 
Central European terrain had caused problems particularly among the 
division men. The military leaders’ attempt was based on the Soviet 
Union’s requests to sign a separate peace pact, communicated via the 
United States. This information reached Finland on 19 August, 1941. 
However, this attempt was as unsuccessful as the aim to sign the separate 
 
37 III.(Finn.)/SS-Pz.Gr.Rgt.”Nordland”, War diary 4.12.1942–11.7.1943. KA Pk 
1141/47; Jokipii (2000), pp. 586–676 and 689–700; Jokipii (2005), p. 63. 
38 Suomalaiset SS-vapaaehtoiset ja väkivaltaisuudet juutalaisia, siviilejä ja 
sotavankeja kohtaan Ukrainassa ja Kaukasuksella 1941–1943, p. 5, Summary in 
Finnish, Lars Westerlund, The Finnish SS-volunteers and atrocities against Jews, 
Civilians and Prisoners of War in Ukraine and the Caucasus Region 1941–1943, 
8.2.2019. [https://arkisto.fi/uploads/Arkisto/2.pdf]. Accessed 9 February 2019; 
Jokipii (2000), pp. 674‒675; Jokipii (2005), p. 63; Lackman (2001), p. 183; Elo 
(2006), pp. 129‒131; Jokipii (2005), p. 68. Kotijoukkojen esikunta, Document No. 
2575/Järj.1/1c.sal./14.9.1943. KA Sk 2530/84. One of the 256 casualties was a 
member of a tribal nation who had not yet obtained Finland’s citizenship. A few of 
volunteers were members of tribal nations, as Ingrians or Karelians. 




peace pact. Instead, it increased suspicions among Germans towards 
Finland.39 
During the autumn of 1941, Finland tried to accelerate the return of the 
unused officers and NCOs. They were not appointed to the promised 
vacancies, in particular in the Wiking division. Furthermore, as the Finnish 
Army was making attacks, new officers and NCOs were in dire need in 
Finland. In addition, these officers and NCOs were willing to return as, 
besides the promised vacancies, they were not given SS ranks matching 
their Finnish military ranks. They were dissatisfied not only with their 
ranks and their frustration with having nothing to do, but also with the 
amount of the German military pay. Germany and Finland eventually 
reach a consensus. Mannerheim underlined that Finland would not expand 
on its demands to cover the entire Finnish battalion. The return of the 20 
unneeded officers from the Wiking division started on 5 January, 1942. In 
the end, 19 of them returned a month later, while one remained in 
Germany. In addition to these 19 officers, five other officers returned to 
Finland in January 1942. By May 1942, 51 officers had been sent home.40 
A significant number of Finnish volunteers returned to Tornio via Oslo 
and Sweden on 17 May, 1942, when unneeded NCOs arrived in Finland. 
This batch consisted of 99 NCOs and 32 regular soldiers. These were 
unneeded NCOs and, according to Jokipii, the saddest cases of the Finnish 
battalion, such as the last living boys of families. Their return was ordered 
on 16 February, 1942. After laying wreathes at heroic soldiers’ graves at 
the Hietaniemi cemetery in Helsinki, they returned home for 
approximately a month, after which they were to register at Infantry 
Training Centre 6 in Lempäälä on 16 June, 1942. It was possible to 
propose at most 20 volunteers for an officer school course starting from 1 
August, 1942. The organisation unit of the Finnish Army Headquarters 
decided on the placement of SS volunteers in military groups. The 
 
39 Jokipii (2000), pp. 409–416 and 873; Elo (2006), pp. 25‒28 and 246; Manninen 
(2011), pp. 10–11; Swanström (2018), pp. 305–306. Jokipii writes about 15 but 
also about 16 returned officers and four NCOs. Swanström mentions 15 officers 
and four NCOs. The figures presented by Veikko Elo can be regarded as the most 
reliable. 
40 Jokipii (2000), pp. 413–426; Swanström (2018), pp. 171–189, 206 and 398. 
Jokipii mainly defines 21 but also 20 returned Finnish officers. In 1942, 17 of the 
Finnish volunteers were sent to Northern Finland to carry out long-range 
reconnaissance missions, and a few Finnish volunteers were also assigned to other 
missions in the service of the SS in German-occupied territories. 
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volunteers who returned to Finland in the first batch were to be divided 
evenly between different parts of the front, but preparations for the 
establishment the Finnish Armoured Division changed plans. On 22 June, 
1942, the Finnish Army Headquarters ordered that the men who had 
served in the motorised infantry unit in Germany were to be sent to the 1st 
Jaeger Brigade of the Armoured Division at Äänislinna. Mannerheim 
approved the establishment of the Finnish Armoured Division on 10 June, 
1942, after which the Armoured Division was formed on 30 June, 1942. 
This order concerned roughly hundred former SS volunteers, as men with 
special training, such as aircraft or communications training, were placed 
in positions matching their training level. It was necessary to send the men 
to Äänislinna as urgently as possible. This was a significant decision as 
this meant that the experience of the SS volunteers in motorised infantry 
could be put to as much use as possible.41 
A separate SS course and other additional courses were held for the SS 
volunteers at Infantry Training Centre 6 between 17 and 24 June, 1942. 
When assessing the volunteers, Infantry Training Centre 6 stated that the 
participants were highly soldierly, active and willing to learn, and that the 
SS course was altogether a positive experience. However, some 15 
soldiers had troubles adapting to peaceful conditions. These had already 
caused difficulties during their service in Germany. Their problems 
 
41 Kotijoukkojen esikunta, Document No. 2845/Järj.3/2.sal./10.5.1942. KA T 
7673/5; Länsi-Pohjan suojeluskuntapiirin esikunta, Document No. 299/III/4 
sal./19.5.1942. KA Sk 2530/72; Kotijoukkojen esikunta, Document No. 
1933/Järj.1a/1c.sal./22.5.1942. KA Sk 2530/72; Päämaja, Document No. 
1168/Lkp.sal./29.5.1942. KA Sk 2530/72; Päämaja, Document No. 3660/Viesti 
1/1a/2.6.1942. KA Sk 2530/72; Kotijoukkojen esikunta, Document No. 
2106/Järj.1a/1c.sal./8.6.1942. KA Sk 2530/72; Päämaja, Document No. 
1421/Lkp.sal./10.6.1942. KA T 19142/3; Päämaja, Document No. 
1859/Kom.2/37/sal./12.6.1942. KA T 2530/72; Päämaja, Document No. 107/LKP/ 
22.6.1942. KA Sk 2530/72; Panssaridivisioona, Document No. 861/III/307 
sal./30.6.1943. Panssaridivisioona, War Diary`s appendices 1942–1943. KA SPK 
19032; Kotijoukkojen esikunta, Document No. 3605/Järj.3/46/23.6.1942. KA Sk 
2530/72; Jalkaväen koulutuskeskuksen 6 esikunta, Document No. 1298/ 
Kom/3.sal./18.9.1942. KA T 7673/7; Kotijoukkojen esikunta, Document No. 
1150/Järj.3/2.sal./31.3.1943. KA T 7673/7; Kotijoukkojen esikunta, Document No. 
3690/Järj.3/2.sal./23.10.1943. KA T 7673/9; Jokipii (2000), pp. 425–426; Käkelä, 
Erkki: Laguksen miehet ‒ Suomalainen panssariyhtymä 1941‒1944, Panssarikilta, 
Jyväskylä, 1992, pp. 209‒218. The main mission of Infantry Training Centre 6, 
operating in the Lempäälä–Kuurila region, was to offer continuing training to the 
infantry. Its other battalion located in Kuurila trained juvenile delinquents 
 




usually resulted from the excessive use of alcohol, but it was said that 
these soldiers had been excellent fighters on the front. According to 
personal assessments, 12 men used to drink too much, four were both 
unreliable and heavy drinkers, one was simply unreliable. The sergeant 
who was given the most crushing assessment out of this lot of 18 men was 
judged to be a complete drunk and untrustworthy in every respect. The 
men assigned to the Armoured Division started their journey towards 
Äänislinna fairly quickly after the order issued by the Finnish Army 
Headquarters.42 
Even though previous research emphasises that once the SS battalion 
had been discontinued, the volunteers were dispersed to all parts of the 
front, the SS volunteers who returned to Finland in the summer of 1942 
were placed in the new Armoured Division. In the first phase, 111 SS 
volunteers were sent to the Armoured Division. However, one more man 
was sent at the beginning of July, as one NCO who was rated in a lower 
service category was sent to the supply unit of the division. The 
centralisation of the SS volunteers in the Armoured Division did not end 
after it was established, since Finnish volunteers who returned to Finland 
in autumn 1942 were still assigned to it. The process proceeded so that 
after their arrival in Finland, the SS volunteers were ordered to register in 
their civil guard districts, whose staffs gathered information about the 
volunteers for use by Home Troops and Infantry Training Centre 6. 
Having registered, the volunteers were able to enjoy two-weeks leave, 
after which they needed to register at Infantry Training Centre 6. The staff 
of the Home Troops requested placement orders for the volunteers from 
the Finnish Army Headquarters. After receiving the orders, the staff of the 
Home Troops sent them to Infantry Training Centre 6, from where the 
volunteers were sent to military groups via personnel replacement centres. 
Similarly in the winter, spring and early summer of 1943, the majority of 
the returned volunteers who were fit for service were sent to the Armoured 
Division. All in all, 14 former SS volunteers were assigned to the 
Armoured Division between September 1942 and June 1943.43 
_____ 
pardoned by the President of Finland. 
42 Jalkaväen koulutuskeskuksen 6 esikunta, Document No. 940/Kom/5.sal./ 
29.6.1942. KA T 7673/5; Jalkaväen koulutuskeskuksen 6 esikunta, Document No. 
950/Kom/5.sal./1.7.1942. KA T 7673/7. 
43 Päämaja, Document No. 3660/Viesti 1/1a/2.6.1942. KA Sk 2530/72; 
Kotijoukkojen esikunta, Document No. 2281/Järj.1a/1c.sal./9.6.1942. KA Sk 
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7. The end of the Finnish Volunteer Battalion of the Waffen SS 
 
After taking leave in Ruhpolding, the Finnish Volunteer Battalion of the 
Waffen SS returned via Tallinn to Hanko where a parade was held on 1 
June, 1943. The next day, an unarmed celebration was held in Tampere, 
after which the battalion men enjoyed a one-month leave period at home. 
Until the summer of 1943, Germany and the SS, in particular, believed 
that the Finnish SS battalion would continue by signing new service 
agreements and by recruiting more men. At first, Finland seemed to 
concede to the SS. After all, at least a small group of the SS volunteers 
wanted to continue their service. However, Mannerheim proposed on 27 
June, 1943, that the Finnish SS battalion should be discontinued. Finland’s 
political leaders were in favour of this proposal, as Finland’s position 
alongside Germany was no longer seen in a positive light. Hitler approved 
this proposal on 4 July, 1943. Even though willing SS men were able to 
renew their agreements for a new six-month period, they accepted the 
proposal of Finland’s military leaders to stay in Finland.44 
The end of the SS battalion was celebrated in Hanko on 11 July, 1943, 
when the volunteers joined the Finnish Defence Forces. Battalion 
Commander, Obersturmbannführer45 Hans Collani reported 12 officers, 
221 NCOs and 585 members of the ranks – 818 soldiers in total. These 
figures are inaccurate and based on SS ranks. According to the Finnish 
organisation unit and following Finnish military ranks, there were 15 
officers, 237 NCOs, 524 privates first class and seven soldiers – altogether 
_____ 
2530/72; Jalkaväen koulutuskeskuksen 6 esikunta, Document No. 939/Kom/5.sal./ 
28.6.1942. KA T 7673/7; Panssaridivisioonan esikunta, Document No. 2141/I/9 
sal./1.7.1942. KA T 7673/7; Kotijoukkojen esikunta, Document No. 3607/Järj.1a/ 
1c.sal./11.9.1942. KA Sk 2530/72; Kotijoukkojen esikunta, Document No. 
3718/Järj.1a/1c.sal./22.9.1942. KA Sk 2530/72; Kotijoukkojen esikunta´s and 
Päämaja´s orders of assignment. KA Sk 2530/72; Kotijoukkojen esikunta´s and 
Päämaja´s orders of assignment. KA Sk 2530/84; Jokipii (2000), p. 722; 
Swanström (2018), p. 368. The presented number of 111 volunteers most likely 
does not include the specially trained men assigned to radio missions within the 
communications unit of the Finnish Army Headquarters, four of whom were 
planned to join the Armoured Division. 
44 Jokipii (2005), pp. 65‒67; Jokipii (2000), pp. 689–719; Swanström (2018), pp. 
114, 324 and 367; III.(Finn.)/SS-Pz.Gr.Rgt.”Nordland”, War diary 4.12.1942–
11.7.1943. KA Pk 1141/47; SS-vapaaehtoistoimisto, Unnumbered document ”25 
% matkalippualennus”, 27.5.1943. KA Pk 1141/53.  
45 Obersturmbannführer matched the rank of a Lieutenant Colonel in the Wehr-
macht. Collani was promoted to this rank on 29 April, 1943. 




783 men. This is close to the specified figure reported by Collani. 
Collani’s confirmed figures were 14 officers, 234 NCOs and 534 rank 
members, i.e., a total of 782 volunteers. According to Veikko Elo, 784 
soldiers returned home. In addition, 21 volunteers were still under German 
care, three volunteers were already serving in the Finnish Air Force and 
one officer was in a Finnish military hospital.46  
Members of the main group were sent from Hanko to Niinisalo and 
further to the front, special missions or the officer school, where many 
volunteers were given officer training before being sent to the front. Since 
the summer of 1942, 21 new officers were trained in the SS course. In 
total, 282 new officers received officer training in Finland. The volunteers 
who were assigned to serve on the front were distributed fairly evenly 
between different parts of the front. According to original sources, only 
one officer, three volunteers assigned to artillery duties and one specially 
trained tank driver were transferred to the Armoured Division. This 
solution was most likely based on the large number of SS volunteers 
previously assigned to it. According to Jokipii, the role of the Armoured 
Division as the unit receiving the most replacements can be questioned 
when only the main group of the volunteers is examined. However, the 
Armoured Division did receive the most replacements, once the 
examination is expanded to cover all SS volunteers who returned to 
Finland.47 
 
46 Kotijoukkojen esikunta, Document No. 1989/Järj.1a/1c.sal./16.7.1943. KA Sk 
2530/84; III.(Finn.)/SS-Pz.Gr.Rgt.”Nordland”, War diary 4.12.1942–11.7.1943. 
KA Pk 1141/47; Päämaja, Document No. 2830/Kom.1/a sal./14.7.1943. 14.7.1943. 
KA Pk 1141/63; Jokipii (2005), p. 67; Jokipii (2000), pp. 422, 719–722 and 934; 
Elo (2006), pp. 29, 55 and 62. 
47 Kotijoukkojen esikunta, Document No. 1989/Järj.1a/1c.sal./16.7.1943. KA Sk 
2530/84; Päämaja, Document No. 2830/Kom.1/a sal./14.7.1943. 14.7.1943. KA Pk 
1141/63; Henkilötäydennyskeskus 2, War diary 16.7.–1.8.1944. KA SPK 7155; 
Henkilötäydennyskeskus 2, Numerous documents. KA T 5585/2; 
Henkilötäydennyskeskus 2, Notebooks. KA T 6911/4; Henkilötäydennyskeskus 3, 
Document No. 102/I/5 sal./25.7.1943. KA 6149/1; Henkilötäydennyskeskus 3, 
Document No. 109/I/5 sal./1.8.1943. KA 6149/1; Henkilötäydennyskeskus 6, 
Notebooks. KA T 7038/1; Päämaja, Document N:o 2950/Koul.1/9.sal./16.6.1943. 
KA T 9427/13; Kotijoukkojen esikunta, Document No. 3530/Järj.3/ 
50.sal./16.10.1943. KA T 9427/13; Päämaja, Document No. 3230/Kom.2/42/ 
sal./18.10.1943. KA T 9427/13; Päämaja, Document No. 5219/Koul.1/9.sal./ 
21.10.1943. KA T 9427/13; Panssaridivisioonan esikunta, Document No. 
2153/I/14 sal./12.11.1943. KA T 9427/13; Jokipii (2005), p. 67; Jokipii (2000), pp. 
422, 719–722 and 934; Swanström (2018), p. 368; Elo (2006), pp. 29, 55 and 62. 
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8. Finnish SS volunteers in research  
 
Finland survived the Second World War, maintaining its independence, 
even though Finland lost ten per cent of its land area, among other things, 
and was forced to pay notable financial reparations to the Soviet Union. 
During the decades after the Second World War, war veterans did not 
receive any significant public recognition in Finnish society. The SS 
volunteers formed an even smaller group. Apart from a few exceptions, 
they rarely raised their voice outside their own group during the decades 
of the Cold War.  
The role of the Finnish SS volunteers during the decades following the 
Second World War in Finnish literature and military history will be 
discussed in the following. The first book on the Finnish SS battalion was 
already written in 1945 when Sakari Lappi-Seppälä, an SS volunteer 
himself, published Haudat Dneprin varrella – SS-miehen päiväkirjan 
lehtiä (Graves by Dnieper – from the diary of an SS man) based on his 
diary entries. Lappi-Seppälä, who was a division man and was sent to 
Finland in 1942 due to allegations of spying, had a critical attitude towards 
the Wiking division and reported on the atrocities committed by the 
Germans. Eric Nupnau published his Swedish-language novel Farligt spel 
– Två års upplevelser i Tyskland under kriget (A dangerous game – 
experiences during two war years in Germany) in 1946. Nupnau was not 
part of the Finnish SS battalion, and he is not included in the number of 
volunteers presented in this article. However, he served the SS in Berlin 
and later became a Finnish citizen. Niilo Lauttamus, one of the battalion 
boys, published his first novel Vieraan kypärän alla (Under a foreign 
helmet) on the Finnish SS battalion in 1957. The novel emphasises the 
_____ 
In the first phase, 66 SS volunteers were accepted for the 57th course of the officer 
school. The course started on 9 July, 1943. All 17 SS volunteers, who returned to 
Finland on 22 September, 1943, and who still attended the officer school (SS-
Junkerschule Bad Tölz) at the time when the main group of the battalion returned 
to Finland, were assigned to the Finnish Armoured Division. However, they were 
assigned to a training course in the officer school, and it was planned that they be 
sent to the officer school when the next course starts. On the basis of notes made in 
the margin, only one of these men who had been promoted to the rank of Staff 
Sergeant did not arrive in the Armoured Division, as he had returned to Germany. 
However, their first service in the Armoured Division was a brief one, as the 58th 
course of the officer school started on 7 January, 1944. 




apolitical attitudes of the Finnish SS volunteers. During the next two 
decades, Lauttamus released five more novels on the same theme.48 
The next texts were published in the late 1950s and the early 1960s. In 
1958, Unto Parvilahti published Terekille ja takaisin – Suomalaisen 
vaapaaehtoisjoukon vaiheita Saksan itärintamalla 1941–43 (To Terek and 
back – stages of the Finnish volunteers in German eastern front from 1941 
to 1943).  He first served as a division man but served most of his time as 
a volunteer in liaison duties in Berlin, taking care of the affairs of Finnish 
SS men. Parvilahti’s book represents the memoir genre at its best in that it 
is no use looking for any criticism of the Finnish SS volunteers from its 
pages. However, Parvilahti only promises to present the memories of a 
soldier who participated in the war. Unto Parvilahti – or Unto Boman 
when serving the SS – was surrendered to the Allied Control Commission 
in April 1945 and sent to prison camps in the Soviet Union, from where he 
returned to Finland in December 1954. In 1960, Jukka Tyrkkö published 
Suomalaisia suursodassa – SS-vapaaehtoisten vaiheita jääkäreiden jäljillä 
(Finns in the Second World War – stages of SS volunteers on the trails of 
jaegers). He served as a volunteer, mainly as a correspondent and in 
propaganda duties. The books by Parvilahti and Tyrkkö have generally 
been recognised as fairly polished depictions of the operations of the 
Finnish SS battalion.49 
The most significant study of the Finnish SS volunteers saw the light of 
day in 1968 when Mauno Jokipii published his Panttipataljoona – 
Suomalaisen SS-pataljoonan historia (The pawn battalion – History of the 
Finnish SS battalion). Four editions of the book have been published, the 
most recent in 2000. When published in the late 1960s, Jokipii’s 
 
48 Suomalaiset SS-vapaaehtoiset ja väkivaltaisuudet juutalaisia, siviilejä ja 
sotavankeja kohtaan Ukrainassa ja Kaukasuksella 1941–1943, p. 5, Summary in 
Finnish, Lars Westerlund, The Finnish SS-volunteers and atrocities against Jews, 
Civilians and Prisoners of War in Ukraine and the Caucasus Region 1941–1943, 
8.2.2019. [https://arkisto.fi/uploads/Arkisto/2.pdf]. Accessed 9 February 2019; 
Jokipii (2000), pp. 911–936; Swanström (2018), p. 80; Elo (2006), p. 40. 
49 Swanström (2018), pp. 16–30, 43, 102–118, 169–170 and 179–191; Jokipii 
(2000), pp. 475 and 911–936; Suomalaiset SS-vapaaehtoiset ja väkivaltaisuudet 
juutalaisia, siviilejä ja sotavankeja kohtaan Ukrainassa ja Kaukasuksella 1941–
1943, p. 5, Summary in Finnish, Lars Westerlund, The Finnish SS-volunteers and 
atrocities against Jews, Civilians and Prisoners of War in Ukraine and the 
Caucasus Region 1941–1943, 8.2.2019. [https://arkisto.fi/uploads/Arkisto/2.pdf]. 
Accessed 9 February 2019; Parvilahti, Unto: Terekille ja takaisin – Suomalaisen 
vapaaehtoisjoukon vaiheita Saksan itärintamalla 1941–43, Otava, Keuruu, passim. 
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monumental work was one of the most significant studies of Finland’s role 
in the Second World War ever published.50 
Jokipii’s study can be regarded, despite any recent allegations of 
brightening the picture and hushing things up, as an ambitious attempt to 
record the history of the Finnish SS battalion.51 It is based on a large group 
of original sources from Finnish and international archives. One of the 
study’s weak points is its fragmented structure due to long diary extracts 
and its inaccuracies and conflicting minor details due to its ambitious 
goals. Mauno Jokipii led the way by publishing several supplementary 
books and articles on the Finnish SS battalion from the late 1960s until the 
beginning of the 2000s. He passed away in 2007.52 Jokipii’s 
Panttipataljoona has been both the foundation stone, upon which later 
research has been built, and a gatekeeper whose interpretations were not 
challenged for decades.  
Of course, individual articles and texts were released immediately after 
Jokipii’s study, but the next larger studies of the volunteers had to wait 
until the 1990s. Veikko Elo’s Pantin lunastajat (Redemption of the 
Finnish SS battalion) was published in 1993. It is more detailed than 
Jokipii’s book, above all, in terms of lists of volunteers.53 Elo’s study also 
made Jokipii supplement the last two editions of his book with more 
detailed lists of names. Elo was also an SS volunteer, which was clearly 
reflected in his book. His book can be regarded as a turning point in the 
research of Finnish SS volunteers in the sense that a few academic theses 
and individual articles on Finnish SS volunteers were soon released after 
its publication. The most notable theses are Heikki Nilkku’s Suomalaisten 
vapaaehtoisten integroituminen Saksan poliittiseen joukko-osastoon 
Waffen-SS:ään (Integration of Finnish volunteers into the Waffen SS) from 
1994 and Anu Vertanen’s Rintamalta Ratakadulle – Suomalaiset SS-
miehet kommunistisen Valpon kohteina 1945–1948 (From front to 
Ratakatu – Finnish SS men under the eye of the communistic state police 
in 1945–1948) from 2005. 
 
50 Jokipii (2000), passim. 
51 E.g. Swanström (2018), pp. 18–23 and 28–30. 
52 Jokipii (2000), passim; Swanström (2018), pp. 150–151. See also Jokipii (1999), 
passim; Jokipii (2002a), passim; Jokipii (2002b), passim; Jokipii (2005), passim. 
53 Elo, Veikko: Pantin lunastajat, self-published, Saarijärvi, 1993, passim. Veikko 
Elo’s Pantin lunastajat was published by Apali in 2006. 




Mauno Jokipii’s final summary of Finnish SS volunteers was Hitlerin 
Saksa ja sen vapaaehtoisliikkeet – Waffen-SS:n suomalaispataljoona 
vertailtavana (Hitler’s Germany and its volunteer movements – Finnish 
Volunteer Battalion of the Waffen SS under review) published in 2002. In 
this book, Jokipii discusses the position of Finnish SS volunteers and 
compares it with other similar foreign troops. According to Jokipii, his 
goal was to study the Finnish SS battalion against a broader international 
background. Jokipii summarises the actions of the SS troops in the holo-
caust. However, he does not discuss or state anything about the role of the 
Finnish SS battalion as part of this inhuman event. In his book, 
consciously or unconsciously, Jokipii mainly holds to describing the 
development of the Waffen SS and the position of its volunteer 
members.54 
The range of studies of Finnish military history regarding the Second 
World War has diversified during the 2000s. For example, the range of 
experience has been studied more than before. However, the research of 
SS volunteers has travelled fairly conventional paths until the most recent 
years. Texts have been and are still published at a fairly regular pace. 
One of the most notable recent Finnish studies is Lars Westerlund’s 
2017 study Cirkus Collani – De finländska SS-frivilliga 1941–43: En 
sedesskildring baserad på de frivilligas egna berättelser (Circus Collani – 
Finnish SS volunteers in 1941–1943: An account based on the volunteers’ 
own stories). Westerlund points out that, for many volunteers, their service 
in the Waffen SS was a professional disappointment. Then again, he notes 
that some of the volunteers reacted negatively to the humiliation of the 
Jews and Bolsheviks. However, the Finnish volunteers had to witness the 
execution of Jews and Soviet prisoners of war during 1941–1943.55 The 
question of any active participation of the Finnish SS volunteers in the 
execution of Jews and Soviet prisoners of war (POWs) has, over the past 
few years, dominated the Finnish debate related to this theme and the 






54 Jokipii (2002a), passim. 
55 Westerlund (2017), passim. 
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9. Overview of research of Finnish SS volunteers in 2019 
 
The publication by André Swanström of Hakaristin ritarit – Suomalaiset 
SS-miehet, politiikka, uskonto ja sotarikokset (Knights of the swastika – 
Finnish SS men, politics, religion and war crimes) in the autumn of 2018 
added fuel to the questions raised by Westerlund. Swanström fiercely 
attacked Jokipii’s interpretations. Above all, Swanström criticised that 
Jokipii had intentionally left out or at least polished over the events related 
to the execution of Jews, civilians and POWs.56 After its publication, 
Swanström’s book raised some considerable debate among researchers 
and, above all, amongst amateur military historians regarding whether the 
Finnish SS volunteers were in some way responsible for war crimes 
against the Jews and Soviet POWs. Swanström was able to credibly show 
that some individual Finnish volunteers witnessed killings of Jews, 
civilians or POWs, and participated in these killings in 1941 and 1942.57  
Swanström’s book has been criticised for its way of making strong 
tendentious generalisations without sufficient sources. Often repeated 
statements of murders, mindless killings of civilians and crimes related to 
the holocaust experienced by the Finnish volunteers were presented 
without any solid evidence.58 Swanström’s book is idealistic rather than 
pragmatic, and it largely ignores the general atmosphere of the time and 
any changes in foreign and military policies. Therefore, Swanström’s book 
remains just one account of the Finnish volunteers which, in the eyes of 
the authors of this article, raises discussion more than acts as a synthesis of 
any war crimes committed by the volunteers.   
A response to, or rather a judgement of, any war crimes committed by 
Finnish volunteers, as presented by Swanström was obtained in February 
2019, when the National Archives of Finland released an archival survey 
of the role of Finnish volunteers who served in the Wiking division 
between 1941 and 1943 in the killings of Jews, civilians and POWs. The 
archival survey is based on a request presented by Efraim Zuroff, director 
of the Simon Wiesenthal Center, to Sauli Niinistö, the President of 
 
56 Swanström (2018), passim. 
57 Swanström (2018), passim; Karjalainen, Mikko: Uusia tulkintoja suomalaisten 
SS-vapaaehtoisten sotatiestä. Kirja-arvostelu Andre Swanströmin teoksesta 
Hakaristin ritarit. Suomalaiset SS-miehet, politiikka, uskonto ja sotarikokset. 
Historiallinen Aikakauskirja 1/2019, Suomen Historiallinen Seura ja Historian 
Ystäväin liitto, Forssa, 2019, pp. 78–80. 




Finland. The Prime Minister’s Office authorised the National Archives to 
prepare the account in January 2018.59 The results of the survey published 
in February 2019 were fairly obvious to researchers of the Finnish SS 
volunteers. It was not able to conclusively show that the Finnish SS 
volunteers participated in war crimes, but it is very likely that some of 
them did not comply with international law. It is hard to see that this 
differed significantly from past conceptions among Finnish researchers 
and amateur military historians specialised in the Second World War and 
Germany. It would be very naive to think that no deviations from 
international law would have taken place in the context in which the 
Finnish volunteers acted in 1941–1943. Furthermore, the archival survey 
does not change the overview of the general motives underlying the 
recruitment or of the activities of most volunteers, when the results are 
compared, for example, with Jokipii’s interpretations.60 
The conclusions of the archival survey can be summarised in the 
following sentences: It is apparent that the Finnish SS volunteers very 
probably participated in the killings and brutalities committed by different 
units of the SS Division Wiking against Jews, civilians and POWs in 1941 
and 1942. However, it should be stated that the available source material 
does not offer sufficiently detailed information in order to assess 
individual events in detail.61 Anyway, the National Archives archival 
survey The Finnish SS-volunteers and atrocities against Jews, Civilians 
and Prisoners of War in Ukraine and the Caucasus Region 1941–1943 
offers a neutral base for any further studies on the theme without holding 
any tendentious passions.  
_____ 
58 Swanström (2018), passim; Karjalainen (2019), pp. 78–80. 
59 Westerlund (2019), passim. 
60 Westerlund (2019), pp. 202‒204; Suomalaiset SS-vapaaehtoiset ja väki-
valtaisuudet juutalaisia, siviilejä ja sotavankeja kohtaan Ukrainassa ja 
Kaukasuksella 1941–1943, passim, Summary in Finnish, Lars Westerlund, The 
Finnish SS-volunteers and atrocities against Jews, Civilians and Prisoners of War 
in Ukraine and the Caucasus Region 1941–1943, 8.2.2019. [https://arkisto.fi/ 
uploads/Arkisto/2.pdf]. Accessed 9 February 2019; Jokipii (2000), passim. 
61 Suomalaiset SS-vapaaehtoiset ja väkivaltaisuudet juutalaisia, siviilejä ja 
sotavankeja kohtaan Ukrainassa ja Kaukasuksella 1941–1943, passim, Summary 
in Finnish, Lars Westerlund, The Finnish SS-volunteers and atrocities against 
Jews, Civilians and Prisoners of War in Ukraine and the Caucasus Region 1941–
1943, 8.2.2019. [https://arkisto.fi/uploads/Arkisto/2.pdf]. Accessed 9 February 
2019. Lars Westerlund worked as a researcher in the survey project for the 
National Archives. 
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In March 2019, Antero Holmila, who has studied the Finnish SS 
volunteers, for example, in his 2013 article “Soldaten wie andere auch”: 
Finnish Waffen-SS volunteers and Finland’s historical imagination, 
summarised the current scope of Finnish research by saying that the study 
of history is like doing a jigsaw puzzle. According to him, the puzzle of 
Finnish SS volunteers is nearly ready, but the archival survey forms the 
edges of this puzzle. It is easy to agree with Holmila’s ideas that the 
Finnish volunteers and their actions in 1941–1943 should be understood in 
the light of the destructive atmosphere prevailing in Germany at the 
time.62 
The debate over research in Finland in the 2017–2019 period shows 
that there is still a place for further studies into the Finnish SS volunteers 
and that not all original material of the activities of the Finnish SS 
volunteers stored in the national archives of different countries has been 
covered. It is apparent that the last word has not been said on this 
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